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Student-Athletes vs. NCAA
PRESERVING AMATEURISM IN COLLEGE SPORTS
AMIDST THE FIGHT FOR PLAYER COMPENSATION
“I do believe that the name, image, likeness for an
individual is a fundamental right—that any individual controls
his or her name, image and likeness—and I don’t believe that a
student-athlete who accepts a grant-in-aid simply waives that
right to his or her name, image, likeness.”1
INTRODUCTION
Student-athletes have a few new opponents on their
schedule. They are fighting their own regulatory board, the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), athletic
conferences, broadcasters, and licensing entities. The NCAA’s
mission is to be “an integral part of the educational program” and
to maintain the amateur status of student-athletes.2 Amateurism,
which is codified in the NCAA’s bylaws, values the distinction
between professional and student athletes and is the crux of the
NCAA’s argument for maintaining regulations prohibiting the
compensation of student-athletes.3 In line with these values, the
NCAA regulates the amateur nature of college athletics to ensure
that education is a principal priority.4 Recently, however, the
controversy surrounding the amateur status of college athletes
has resulted in challenges under antitrust law to the NCAA’s
regulations prohibiting compensation of student-athletes. The

1 Steve Berkowitz, Oliver Luck Brings Own Perspective to NCAA on O’Bannon
Name and Likeness Issue, USA TODAY (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:05 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/sports/college/2015/01/16/ncaa-convention-oliver-luck-obannon-name-and-likenesscourt-case/21873331/ [http://perma.cc/H8DL-Z95C] (quoting Oliver Luck, NCAA Executive
Vice President for Regulatory Affairs).
2 NCAA, 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2013), http://fordhamsports.com/
custompages/compliance/forms/CoachCompliance/2013-14%20NCAA%20Manual.pdf [http://
perma.cc/HT58-V46E].
3 Id. at 4.
4 Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism [http://perma.cc/9PFPEA3T] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
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NCAA is now being confronted with something it has not faced in
years: a viable challenge to its amateurism regulations.
While student-athletes are the backbone of the $11 billion
college sports industry, they never receive any of this revenue.5 In
2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball player for
the UCLA Bruins, saw an avatar of himself in a video game.6 This
virtual player not only physically resembled O’Bannon, it wore a
UCLA jersey, which depicted his number, 31.7 Like all college
athletes, O’Bannon waived the right to receive compensation for
the use of his “name, image, or likeness” when he joined the
NCAA, and therefore he was never compensated for their use in
this video game.8 Soon after, in 2009, O’Bannon brought an
antitrust class action lawsuit against the NCAA, challenging the
Association’s regulations that restrict compensation for the use of
Division I athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in media, other
footage, and merchandise.9 Around the same time, Sam Keller, a
former starting quarterback at Arizona State and Nebraska
Universities, filed a similar lawsuit against the NCAA, Electronic
Arts (EA), a video game developer, and the Collegiate Licensing
Company (CLC), the entity that licenses the NCAA’s
trademarks.10
These cases were initially consolidated, but after EA and
CLC settled claims for damages, the cases were deconsolidated,11
and O’Bannon continued to seek an injunction to enjoin the
NCAA from enforcing regulations that prevent Division I football
and men’s basketball student-athletes from receiving

5 Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the
NCAA’s No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 61,
63 (2013); see also NCAA, REVENUES & EXPENSES: NCAA DIVISION I INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS PROGRAMS REPORT 2004-2011, at 31-32, 39 (2012). The NCAA prohibits
student-athletes from receiving compensation outside of permitted scholarships. See
2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, at 191-214.
6 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at *3 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Class Action Complaint at 2-5, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No. CV 09 3329 (N.D.
Cal. July 21, 2009), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter O’Bannon Complaint].
10 See, e.g., In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and Likeness Licensing Litig.,
724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013).
11 The NCAA awarded a $20 million settlement “to certain Division I men’s
basketball and Division I Bowl Subdivision football student-athletes who attended” specific
schools for their names, images, and likenesses used in college-themed basketball and
football video games produced by EA. NCAA Reaches Settlement in EA Video Game
Lawsuit, NCAA (June 9, 2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/mediacenter/press-releases/ncaa-reaches-settlement-ea-video-game-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/4AZ2LTYD].
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compensation for use of their names, images, or likenesses.12 The
plaintiffs alleged that the NCAA exploited current and former
athletes in order to obtain revenue from media rights for televised
games, DVD sales, jersey sales, video games, corporate
advertising, photographs, action figures, trading cards, posters,
rebroadcasts of classic games, and more.13 The complaint further
alleged that by requiring student-athletes to release their rights
to compensation, the NCAA violated antitrust laws by using its
bylaws to financially benefit from the names, images, and
likenesses of eighteen-year-old student-athletes.14
On August 8, 2014, the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California issued an injunction prohibiting
the NCAA’s strict ban on the compensation of collegiate studentathletes.15 Judge Wilken opined that while this case focused on
athletic competition, “it is principally about the rules governing
competition in a different arena—namely, the marketplace.”16 In
light of these concerns, the court held that NCAA regulations
precluding student-athletes from receiving a share of revenue
from their own names, images, and likenesses violated the
antitrust laws, specifically section 1 of the Sherman Act.17 As a
remedy for this violation, the district court held that the NCAA
must allow its member institutions to offer scholarships to cover
the full cost of attendance and up to $5,000 per year in deferred
compensation, which would be held in a trust for student-athletes
until after they leave the institution.18
The NCAA appealed this decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit based on defenses of amateurism
and First Amendment protection of live television broadcasts.19
The Ninth Circuit agreed with much of Judge Wilken’s analysis
and unanimously upheld the finding that the NCAA violated the
Sherman Act by limiting compensation to student-athletes.20
The three-judge panel also affirmed the district court’s holding
that the NCAA must allow schools to offer scholarships that
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9, at 2-5, 8.
Id. at 37-58.
14 Id. at 5.
15 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
16 Id. at 962.
17 Id. at 1007-08; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
18 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
19 Jon Solomon, O’Bannon Plaintiffs Won’t Appeal Judge’s NCAA Ruling,
CBSSPORTS.COM (Sept. 8, 2014, 12:33 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/
jon-solomon/24701112/obannon-plaintiffs-wont-appeal-judges-ncaa-ruling [http://perma.cc/
AF9G-L2NB].
20 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2015); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
12

13
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cover the full cost of attendance. But the Ninth Circuit disagreed
with the district court’s holding regarding the trust and found it
was clearly erroneous to uphold the trust as a substantially less
restrictive alternative to the NCAA’s amateur-status regulation.21
As O’Bannon continues, so too does an era of litigation
surrounding the NCAA.22 Plaintiffs continue to challenge the
regulations promulgated by the NCAA and the athletic
conferences, arguing that the Ninth Circuit erred in not permitting
additional cash compensation.23 In light of the O’Bannon litigation,
this note argues that while the creation of a trust was not a viable
remedy under antitrust law, the NCAA itself should permit this
model of regulated, minimal compensation. Ultimately,
maintaining amateurism in college athletics does not preclude
minimal compensation of student-athletes. By adopting a trust
model, the NCAA would avoid the need for reorganization among
conferences, broadcasters, and third parties in order to manage
the emerging rights of student-athletes. Furthermore, by
analyzing the compensatory alternatives to the NCAA’s current
regulations, this note suggests that amateurism, while hanging
by a thread, is still a necessary, significant, and most importantly,
maintainable part of college athletics.
Part I of this note discusses the NCAA’s past and present
practices in balancing amateurism and the compensation of
student-athletes, specifically with respect to the student-athletes’
names, images, and likenesses. Part II briefly describes the
O’Bannon litigation and the NCAA’s amateurism defense. It also
examines current NCAA regulations and their interaction with
antitrust law. Part III analyzes the implications O’Bannon is
likely to have on amateurism as the foundation of college sports
and addresses how the Ninth Circuit’s decision may affect the
21 O’Bannon, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1, *22. The NCAA changed its regulations to
permit full cost-of-attendance scholarships after its annual convention in January 2015.
Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Autonomy Schools Adopt Cost of Attendance Scholarships, NCAA
(Jan. 18, 2015, 6:58 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/autonomyschools-adopt-cost-attendance-scholarships [http://perma.cc/M7EB-5V7G].
22 Two weeks following the Ninth Circuit decision, plaintiffs asked the court for
an en banc rehearing of the case, in which an eleven-member panel of Ninth Circuit judges
would review the majority decision of the three-member panel. See Plaintiffs-Appellees’
Petition for Rehearing En Banc, NCAA v. O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Oct.
14, 2015), ECF No. 106-1. However, this request was subsequently denied by the court. See
Order, NCAA v. O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Dec 16, 2015), ECF No. 116.
Both parties have indicated an interest in petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, in
which case they have until March 14, 2016, to file an appeal. See Jon Solomon, Judges Deny
O’Bannon Petition to Rehear Appeal vs. NCAA, CBSSPORTS.COM (Dec. 16, 2015, 1:54 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25416207/judges-deny-obannon
-petition-to-rehear-appeal-vs-ncaa- [http://perma.cc/6CG8-YXV3].
23 See infra Part II.
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NCAA’s future as a regulatory body. Part IV argues that while
implementing a trust at the order of the district court in
O’Bannon was erroneous, the NCAA itself should adopt this type
of compensatory structure. Ultimately, this trust model will allow
for minimal compensation of student-athletes while still
preserving amateurism as the cornerstone of college athletics and
distinguishing them from professional sports. Significantly, both
the court and consumers in the college sports market have made
it clear that they prefer to keep a divide between collegiate and
professional sports.24 While the obvious way to uphold the unique
and independent nature of college athletics is to keep the players
on an unpaid, amateur level, this may no longer be a viable
solution. In order to maintain student-athletes’ amateur status
while simultaneously complying with antitrust law, this note
argues that the NCAA should develop a more hands-off
regulatory approach that best serves student-athletes by allowing
schools to enter into a revenue sharing system similar to the
model used by the International Olympic Committee.
I.

OVERVIEW OF NCAA BYLAWS AND COMPLIANCE
REQUIREMENTS

A.

History of the NCAA’s Regulation of Amateurism

Intercollegiate athletics as we know it began on November
6, 1869, when Rutgers played Princeton in what was the first
intercollegiate football game in American history.25 As the
popularity of college football spread rapidly, so did the issues
surrounding the game. Due to the nature of the sport, players
often suffered serious injuries and were even killed during
games.26 In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt held a conference
to address the issues in collegiate football.27 That same year, 62
colleges gathered to form the Intercollegiate Athletic Association
and develop a uniform set of regulations to address the safety
concerns in college football.28 Five years later, the group changed

See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
Allen Barra, The First Down, Ever, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2009, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703932904574511921170497590 [http://
perma.cc/2RWR-9925].
26 O’Bannon, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1.
27 Dan Treadway, Why Does the NCAA Exist?, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2013,
1:39 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-treadway/johnny-manziel-ncaa-eligibility_b
_3020985.html [http://perma.cc/8FQQ-HFNB].
28 O’Bannon, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1-2.
24

25
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its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association and
required that all participants be amateurs.29
In the 1930s and 1940s, as commercialization efforts
attracted increased public attention to college sports, it was not
uncommon for alumni to provide tuition for athletes attending
their alma mater.30 But because participation in the NCAA was
voluntary at this time, the Association lacked the authority to
enforce the amateurism requirement on its member
institutions.31 Although many universities banned these “payfor-play” practices on their own,32 a 1929 study found that 81 of
112 schools provided some type of improper compensation to
student-athletes.33 As public interest in intercollegiate athletics
increased, the NCAA gained control over college athletics and
developed regulations to balance the commercialization of the
industry with the values of higher education.34 In 1948, it
implemented the “Sanity Code,” which prohibited schools from
providing student-athletes with any financial aid based on
athletic ability or aid not available to all students.35
In 1956, the NCAA developed new regulations and
amended its bylaws to allow schools to award athletic scholarships
to student-athletes.36 Because this new structure permitted
universities to distribute financial aid without consideration of
need or academic achievement, monetary inducements became a
way for schools to target athletes.37 Therefore, in order to balance
the competing values of commercialization and amateurism, the
NCAA gained better control over its member institutions by
establishing enforcement authority over the amateurism
provisions.38 It did so through regulations that addressed
student-athlete eligibility, limited financial inducements,
penalized improper payments, and removed all pay-for-play
Id. at *1.
Jonathan Strom, Putting Our Trust in the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA): How Creating Trusts for Student-Athletes Can Save the NCAA
from Itself, 6 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 423, 426 (2014).
31 See Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of
Amateurism or Antitrust Recidivist?, 86 OR. L. REV. 329, 332 (2007).
32 Strom, supra note 30, at 426.
33 O’Bannon, 2015 WL 5712106, at *2.
34 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9,
13-15 (2000).
35 Gary T. Brown, NCAA Answers Call to Reform: The ‘Sanity Code’ Leads
Association Down Path to Enforcement Program, NCAA (Nov. 22, 1999), http://fs.ncaa.org/
Docs/NCAANewsArchive/1999/19991122/active/3624n24.html [http://perma.cc/KQA6-AUPP].
36 See Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 333-34.
37 Id. at 334.
38 Smith, supra note 34, at 13-15.
29
30
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models from the system.39 This current—and far more
regulatory—structure of the NCAA is made evident by the 420
pages of the Division I Manual.40
B.

Amateurism and Compensation in the Modern NCAA

Today, the NCAA has approximately 1,200 member
institutions and regulates 24 sports.41 The member institutions
are organized into Divisions I, II, and III.42 Division I, which is
at issue in the current litigation, consists of about 350 schools
with the largest athletic programs that are each required to
sponsor at least 14 varsity teams.43 As the regulatory body for
college athletics, the NCAA has a mission to “initiate, stimulate
and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for studentathletes.”44 The NCAA strives to distinguish collegiate athletics
from sports of a professional nature by focusing on the amateur
nature of the participants.
Amateurism, codified by section 12 of the NCAA’s bylaws,
states that college athletics are “designed to be an integral part of
the educational program,” and therefore it is necessary to
“maintain[ ] a clear line of demarcation between college athletics
and professional sports.”45 In line with these values, the NCAA
prohibits student-athletes from receiving compensation in order
to protect them from “exploitation by professional and commercial
enterprises.”46 Section 12.1.2 indicates that a college-athlete will
lose amateur status if he or she
(a) [u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any
form in that sport; (b) [a]ccepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be
received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation;
(c) [s]igns a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional
athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration
39 Strom, supra note 30, at 428; see also Lazaroff, supra note 31, at 334
(discussing revised regulations, which included “‘capping’ financial inducements, limiting
transfers, and penalizing ‘under-the-table payments’”).
40 See generally NCAA, 2015-16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (2015),
http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D116.pdf [http://perma.cc/WCX6EUR7] (laying out all of the NCAA’s regulations of its member institutions, conferences,
coaches, and student-athletes).
41 Id.
at 406; Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/
membership [http://perma.cc/JHP9-BYHG] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
42 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at *2 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
43 Id. Note that the O’Bannon litigation involves only NCAA regulations for
Division I athletics. Id.
44 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, at 1.
45 Id. at 57.
46 Id. at 4.
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received . . . ; (d) [r]eceives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement
of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional
sports organization based on athletics skill or participation, except as
permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) [c]ompetes on any
professional athletics team . . . even if no pay or remuneration for
expenses was received . . . .; (f) [a]fter initial full-time collegiate
enrollment, enters into a professional draft . . . . [; or] (g) [e]nters into an
agreement with an agent.47

Amateurism is not only an issue at the forefront of the
O’Bannon litigation—it is the NCAA’s basis for maintaining their
current regulations, which restrict the compensation of studentathletes.48 There are very limited instances in which a studentathlete may receive compensation.49 The NCAA codifies the
distinction between college athletics and professional sports in
Article 12 of its bylaws, which requires student-athletes to be
amateurs in their respective sports in order to participate in
NCAA-sponsored events.50 Student-athletes are not eligible to
participate in a sport if they have ever taken pay or the promise of
pay for competing in that sport.51 More specifically, players are
not eligible if they have ever accepted money, transportation, or
other benefits from an agent, including having an agent market
their athletic ability or reputation in that sport.52 Recent criticism
of Article 12 attacks the founding principle of amateurism,53 but
the NCAA maintains its position, stating that the amateur nature
of the NCAA is “crucial to preserving an academic environment in
which acquiring a quality education is the first priority.”54
While member universities may provide scholarships to
student-athletes, the NCAA requires that these scholarships
follow the same procedures as those awarded to non-studentathletes.55 Whereas Article 15 previously indicated that studentathletes may receive a scholarship of no more than a “grant-in-

Id. at 59.
See generally O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9 (stating that the NCAA’s
defense to the antitrust claims in O’Bannon rests on the values of amateurism in college
athletics).
49 See 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 2, at 191-214.
50 Id. at 57.
51 Id. at 59.
52 Id. at 66.
53 See, e.g., Steve Wieberg, Despite Criticism, NCAA Takes Firm Stance on
Professionalism, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2011, 1:41 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/college/2011-01-03-ncaa-professionalism_N.htm [http://perma.cc/5BKV-ZSRX].
54 Amateurism, supra note 4.
55 See 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 57; infra Section III.A.
47
48
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aid,”56 the NCAA’s amended bylaws permit schools to give
scholarships up to the full cost of attendance, “an amount
calculated by an institutional financial aid office, using federal
regulations, that includes the total cost of tuition and fees, room
and board, books and supplies, transportation, and other
expenses related to attendance at the institution.”57 The bylaws
also explain that an athlete may lose his or her eligibility to
compete as a Division I athlete by receiving “financial aid other
than that permitted by the Association” or through involvement
with professional teams.58
Because these regulations prevent student-athletes from
receiving any form of compensation, net profits from the college
sports industry go directly to the schools, athletic conferences, and
the NCAA. Since the NCAA and its member institutions sell and
license products using the names, images, and likeness of current
and former student-athletes, the organizations receive 100% of
the royalties.59 This means that student-athletes are precluded
from receiving compensation for any video games, rebroadcasts of
classic games, DVDs of games, photographs, and replica jerseys
that use their name, image, or likeness.60 Furthermore, Collegiate
Licensing Company, the NCAA’s primary licensing partner, owns
nearly 85% of the college licensing market, which nets over $4
billion in retail sales.61 One of the NCAA’s core reasons for
promoting amateurism regulations is to prevent the exploitation
of
student-athletes
“by
professional
and
commercial
enterprises.”62 Yet it appears that the NCAA may be exploiting
the very people that it claims to be protecting.
In addition to its bylaws, the NCAA requires all Division I
athletes to sign Form 08-3a, which requires student-athletes to
waive their rights to the commercial use of their name, image,
and likeness in perpetuity.63 The form specifically states, “You
56 “A full grant-in-aid is financial aid that consists of tuition and fees, room and
board, and required course-related books.” 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note
2, at 193.
57 See id. at 192. The NCAA changed its regulations to permit full cost-ofattendance scholarships after its annual convention in January 2015. Hosick, supra note 21;
see also infra Section II.B (discussing the reasons for this change to the NCAA regulations).
58 Id. at 191.
59 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9, at 4.
60 William D. Holthaus Jr., Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA: Do Former NCAA
Athletes Have a Case Against the NCAA for Its Use of Their Likenesses?, 55 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2010).
61 Id. at 372-73.
62 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 4.
63 NCAA, FORM 08-3A, ACADEMIC YEAR 2010-11: NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE
STATEMENT-DIVISION I, at 4 (2008), http://www.liberty.edu/media/1912/compliance/newf
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authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting on behalf of the
NCAA] to use your name or picture to generally promote NCAA
championships or other NCAA events, activities or programs.”64
This means that a student-athlete must permit the NCAA and
the student’s respective university to use or sell the studentathlete’s name, image, or likeness to any third party while
agreeing that the student will never receive any compensation for
the use of their personal image, including after they graduate and
are no longer subject to the NCAA’s regulations. While Article 12
only allows for the use of names, images, and likenesses of players
affiliated with a university for limited promotional reasons, the
plaintiffs in O’Bannon alleged that both the NCAA and its
member institutions interpreted the language broadly in order to
enter into self-profiting licensing agreements.65
II.

O’BANNON V. NCAA: MAKING A CASE FOR THE STUDENTATHLETE

Ed O’Bannon, along with 19 other former and current
Division I football and men’s basketball players, brought claims
against the NCAA and its partner, the Collegiate Licensing
Company, a for-profit corporation66 that oversees all of the
licensing and rights distribution for the NCAA.67 The complaint
alleged that the NCAA’s regulations forcing student-athletes to
release the rights to their names, images, and likenesses without
compensation violate section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act,
which prohibits “[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce.”68 With respect to the class
seeking damages, the complaint further alleged that the NCAA
unreasonably restrained trade and commercially exploited former
student-athletes by continuing to sell products using their images
well after they graduated.69
ormsdec2010/currentflames/compliance/SA%20Statement%20Form.pdf [http://perma.cc/3
ZFQ-T8G7].
64 Id.
65 O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9, at 3-7.
66 Id. at 3; About CLC, COLLEGIATE LICENSING CO., http://www.clc.com/AboutCLC.aspx [http://perma.cc/2EXJ-9JBD] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
67 Id.
68 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86, 98
(1984) (noting that in determining the reasonability of restraints on trade, courts will
apply a “rule of reason” test).
69 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). The complaint sought unspecified damages from the
NCAA and its partners for profits accrued from selling the following: media rights for
televising games, DVD and On-Demand sales and rentals, video clip sales to corporate
advertisers, photos, action figures, trading cards, posters, video games, rebroadcasts of
classic games, jerseys, and other apparel. See O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9, at 37-58.
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O’Bannon specifically pointed to Form 08-3a70 as the
method for how the NCAA obtained ownership of these rights,
and noted that the signatories were coerced and uninformed and
in some cases, the forms were even signed by minors.71 Since
failure to sign this form renders a student-athlete ineligible to
participate in NCAA athletics, plaintiffs submitted that this put
unfair pressure on young students to relinquish their licensing
rights not only while they were in college, but for the rest of their
lives.72 Plaintiffs asserted that the NCAA’s prohibition of
compensation for student-athletes for the use of their names,
images, and likenesses was an unlawful restraint of trade under
the Sherman Act.73
In response, the NCAA argued that its restrictions on
compensation are justifiable “because they are necessary to
preserve its tradition of amateurism, maintain competitive
balance . . . , promote . . . academics and athletics, and increase
the total output of its product.”74 Thirty years ago, the Supreme
Court upheld amateurism as a viable defense to antitrust
challenges to the NCAA’s regulations.75 The Supreme Court’s
decision in favor of the NCAA specifically stated that amateurism
was precisely what made college sports unique.76 In its opinion,
which resolved a dispute over the NCAA’s licensing agreements
with broadcast networks, the Court took note of the importance of
upholding the NCAA’s amateurism requirements.
The identification of [college football] with an academic tradition
differentiates [it] from and makes it more popular than professional
sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example,
minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of
the “product,” athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend
class, and the like. And the integrity of the “product” cannot be
preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such

See supra Section I.B (discussing Form 08-3a of the NCAA Manual).
O’Bannon Complaint, supra note 9, at 4-5.
72 Id. at 6 (alleging that Form 08-3a is designed to force student-athletes to
release all licensing rights in order for the NCAA to avoid future compensation to
former players).
73 Id.
74 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 973 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
75 NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Brian
Welch, Comment, Unconscionable Amateurism: How the NCAA Violates Antitrust by
Forcing Athletes to Sign Away Their Image Rights, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 533, 541
(2011); see also Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 862-63 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Gaines v.
NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744-45 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
76 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-11.
70
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restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing
field might soon be destroyed.77

Here, the Supreme Court used a “rule of reason” test to weigh the
NCAA’s restraint of trade against the need for amateurism
regulations in light of an alleged antitrust violation.78 This threestep test established the following requirements: (1) the plaintiff’s
showing that the restraint produces substantial “adverse,
anticompetitive effects within the relevant product and
geographic markets”; (2) the defendant’s demonstration that the
restraint promotes “a sufficiently pro-competitive objective”; and
(3) the plaintiff’s proof that the restraint is not “reasonably
necessary to achieve the stated objective.”79 In this final step, the
plaintiff may suggest less restrictive alternatives by showing that
the same “objectives can be achieved in a substantially less
restrictive manner.”80
Under this third prong, suggesting that current
regulations were not necessary to maintain amateurism,
O’Bannon proposed three alternatives to the current regulations:
(1) “allow schools to award stipends derived from . . . licensing
revenue[ ] to student-athletes”; (2) “allow schools to deposit a
share of licensing revenue into a trust fund for studentathletes . . . [to] be paid after the student-athlete[ ] graduate[s]” or
leaves school permanently; and (3) “permit student-athletes to
receive limited compensation for third-party endorsements”
approved by their respective schools.81 O’Bannon refrained from
attacking amateurism as a core value of the NCAA and instead
offered reform that would contribute to a more equitable
bargaining relationship between the NCAA and student-athletes.82
A.

O’Bannon in the District Court

Prior to O’Bannon, antitrust claims against the NCAA had
not been successful, as courts followed the Supreme Court’s lead
and deferred to the amateurism justification in favor of the
NCAA’s trade restrictions.83 Thirty years later, however, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California broke this
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 120 (acknowledging that the NCAA should be given deference in
maintaining the unique amateur nature of collegiate athletics).
79 Scherling-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065 (11th Cir. 2005).
80 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 985 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting
Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)).
81 Id. at 982.
82 Welch, supra note 75, at 555-56.
83 Id. at 538-40.
77
78
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trend, holding in O’Bannon that the NCAA was in violation of the
Sherman Act and entering an injunction requiring reform to the
Association’s regulations.84
In applying the rule of reason test used by the Supreme
Court in Board of Regents, the district court determined that the
NCAA’s restraint on compensation violated antitrust law because
it did not reasonably support a procompetitive purpose.85 It first
found that in a “college education market,” NCAA compensation
regulations have a significant anticompetitive effect because they
fix the price that schools pay to secure college athletes’ services.86
Next, the court individually addressed each of the NCAA’s
justifications for its restriction on compensation of studentathletes87 and acknowledged that the NCAA’s rules serve two
procompetitive purposes—the promotion of amateurism and the
integration of academics with athletics—because both increase
consumer demand for college sports.88 In the third step of the
analysis, the court determined whether there were any
“substantially less restrictive alternatives” to the NCAA’s
current rules.89
Consistent with its findings that there existed less
restrictive alternatives, the court issued an injunction against the
NCAA requiring that it permit member schools to offer studentathletes scholarships equal to the full cost of attendance.90
Additionally, the district court adopted one of O’Bannon’s
suggested alternatives, which would permit schools to hold
payments in trust for student-athletes.91 The court held that
member schools could set aside $5,000 per academic year in
deferred compensation that would be distributed after a studentathlete’s graduation.92 This was the first time a federal court found
that the NCAA’s amateurism regulations violated antitrust laws,
let alone issued an injunction requiring changes to the bylaws.93
The district court suggested that holding a limited amount
of money in a trust until after student-athletes have left school
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08.
Id. at 985 (citing American Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 203 (2010)) (stating that “[t]he Supreme Court . . . specifically held that concerted
actions undertaken by joint ventures should be analyzed under the rule of reason”).
86 Id. at 973.
87 Id. at 1000-04.
88 Id. at 999-1003.
89 Id. at 1005.
90 Id. at 1007-08.
91 Id. at 1008.
92 Id.
93 O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1 (9th
Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
84

85
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would compensate them for the use of their names, images, and
likenesses while still “integrating academics and athletics.”94
According to Judge Wilken, the NCAA did not provide enough
evidence that paying players would affect the procompetitive
balance of the market.95 Most significantly, the district court
noted that while amateurism could justify limited restrictions on
student-athlete compensation, it could not justify the particular
restrictions on receiving compensation for the use of those
student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses.96 Furthermore,
the district court found that O’Bannon presented “ample
evidence . . . to show that the college sports industry has changed
substantially in the thirty years since Board of Regents was
decided.”97 And therefore, the values served by upholding
amateurism “do not justify the rigid prohibition on
compensating . . . [for] the use of [players’] names, images and
likenesses.”98 Ultimately, the district court determined that the
NCAA’s blanket restraints on compensation violated antitrust
law and held that less restrictive alternatives were available. The
court issued an injunction requiring the NCAA to alter its
regulations in two ways: first, to permit its member institutions to
issue scholarships up to full cost of attendance, and second, to
allow its members to hold a maximum of $5,000 annually in a
trust for each student-athlete.
B.

O’Bannon in the Ninth Circuit

The NCAA appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, noting that it would continue to fight to preserve the
current NCAA model.99 After an expedited review,100 the court
issued an opinion on September 30, 2015.101 In this longO’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1008.
Id. at 1003.
96 Id. at 1001.
97 Id. at 999-1000.
98 Id. at 1001.
99 See Steve Berkowitz, Oliver Luck Brings Own Perspective to NCAA on
O’Bannon Name and Likeness Issue, USA TODAY S PORTS (Jan. 16, 2015, 6:05 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/01/16/ncaa-convention-oliver-luck-obann
on-name-and-likeness-court-case/21873331/ [http://perma.cc/Z2ZR-3KZ8].
100 The district court’s injunction was scheduled to take effect on August 1, 2015.
The parties filed a joint motion for an expedited motion schedule, in which the NCAA
contended that the NCAA and its members would be “forced to make fundamental changes
to the administration of collegiate athletics and to their relationships with student athletes.”
Joint Motion to Revise Briefing Schedule at 1-2, O’Bannon v. NCAA, No.14-16601 (9th Cir.
Sept. 19, 2014), ECF No. 7.
101 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at *1
(9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015).
94
95
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anticipated ruling, the three judge panel affirmed the district
court’s injunction and required the NCAA to allow its member
schools to give student-athletes scholarships up to the full cost of
attendance because, the court stated, the regulations had
“significant anticompetitive effects.”102 The Ninth Circuit also
held, however, that the district court’s remedy of allowing
student-athletes to receive compensation in the form of a trust
was erroneous, and the court struck it down as a less restrictive
alternative.103
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court in holding
that NCAA rules are subject to antitrust scrutiny and must be
tested within the “crucible of the Rule of Reason.”104 In applying
the same three-part rule of reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit
concluded, in line with the district court, that while under the
first step of the analysis, the NCAA’s compensation regulations
have anticompetitive effects by precluding student-athletes from
receiving compensation, they serve two procompetitive purposes
under the second step: (1) preserving the NCAA by promoting
amateurism and (2) “integrating academics with athletics.”105 The
appellate decision found Judge Wilken’s analysis of college
athletics consistent with the Supreme Court’s in Board of Regents,
in that there is “an academic tradition [that] differentiates [it] from
and makes it more popular than professional sports to which it
might otherwise be comparable.”106
The Ninth Circuit emphasized, though, that not every
NCAA regulation that restricts the market is “necessary to
preserving the ‘character’ of college sports.”107 Thus, the panel
moved to the third step of the analysis and looked to
reasonable and “substantially less restrictive” alternatives to
the NCAA’s compensation regulations.108 The Ninth Circuit
upheld setting a grant-in-aid cap at the full cost of attendance,
as it is a substantially less restrictive alternative to the trust
model that still accomplishes the NCAA’s two procompetitive
purposes.109 Ultimately, even before the panel issued its opinion
upholding this part of the injunction, the NCAA amended its

Id. at *1, *21.
Id. at *1.
104 Id. at *26.
105 Id. at *21.
106 Id. at *22 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
101-02 (1984)).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. at *22-23.
102
103
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regulations allowing its members to fund student-athletes’ full
cost of attendance.110
The district court upheld the trust as a less restrictive
alternative, stating that a “modest payment” of $5,000 a year
would not undermine the NCAA’s legitimate goal of protecting
and preserving amateurism.111 However, prior to the Ninth
Circuit decision, some argued that the $5,000 cap was an
arbitrary award not in line with the court’s opinion and would
ultimately be overruled by the Ninth Circuit.112 The Ninth Circuit
indeed disagreed vehemently with the district court, concluding
that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that
giving student-athletes minimal compensation would be “as
effective in preserving amateurism as not paying them” at all.113
In what may be the most influential part of the decision, the court
suggested there might be a slippery slope in permitting
compensation of student-athletes for purely athletic endeavors
and feared this type of compensation would turn college athletics
into the “minor league[s].”114
The difference between offering student-athletes education-related
compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to educational
expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed, we
see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism and no defined
stopping point . . . . At that point the NCAA will have surrendered its
amateurism principles entirely and transitioned from its “particular
brand of football” to minor league status.115

Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the NCAA needed to reform its practices; however, neither
court felt it necessary to do away with amateurism. Both decisions
included strong dicta supporting the value of amateurism in college
athletics. Judge Wilken herself conceded that there are limits to
the district court’s decision and that amateurism “might justify a
restriction on large payments to student-athletes while in
school.”116 There are significant tensions still at play between the
values of education and amateurism and the goals of
compensating college athletes. However, by upholding both values
110 The NCAA changed its regulations to permit full cost-of-attendance
scholarships after its annual convention in January 2015. Hosick, supra note 21.
111 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
112 See, e.g., Michael McCann, Next Steps in O’Bannon Case: Both NCAA and the
Plaintiffs Could Appeal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.si.com/collegefootball/2014/08/11/obannon-ncaa-case-appeal-next-steps [http://perma.cc/C85R-Z4R5].
113 O’Bannon, 2015 WL 5712106, at *25.
114 Id. at *26 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (footnote omitted)).
115 Id.
116 O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001.
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in its decisions, perhaps the court left room for the NCAA to adopt
a model that incorporates both compensation and amateurism.
C.

The Future of Amateurism and O’Bannon

Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision, commentators
suggested that O’Bannon would open the gate to a flood of future
litigation surrounding student-athletes’ compensation.117 The
appellate decision does not preclude a similar outcome for other
litigation, especially as O’Bannon remains ongoing. Two weeks
after the Ninth Circuit handed down its opinion, plaintiffs filed a
petition seeking an en banc rehearing in which an eleven-member
panel of Ninth Circuit judges would review the case.118 In this
petition, the plaintiffs maintained that the majority erroneously
reversed the implementation of the $5,000 trust and “treated
amateurism as an all-or-nothing proposition—that paying college
athletes even a dollar would necessarily dampen enthusiasm
among fans.”119 They further requested that the district court
decision be upheld, particularly portions finding that “with ample
support from the NCAA’s own witnesses, consumer interest in
college sports is driven almost entirely by school loyalty and
geography—and not by the restraint [on compensation].”120 The
Ninth Circuit panel subsequently denied the plaintiffs’ request for
an en banc rehearing.121 In past comments, both parties have
indicated an interest in petitioning the Supreme Court for
certiorari, in which case they have until March 14, 2016, to file an
appeal.122 Ultimately, however, the Ninth Circuit decision does
not preclude the implementation of a trust, as it simply held that
based on the record, the trust was beyond the scope of the
judiciary as a viable remedy under antitrust law. In the event
that the Supreme Court grants certiorari, in order to enjoin the
NCAA to permit a trust, plaintiffs would need to develop a record
with substantial evidence that a trust would be a viable
remedy.123 Alternatively, and more practically, the NCAA may of
its own volition choose to implement this trust as a part of its own
regulatory structure.
See, e.g., McCann, supra note 112.
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 22.
119 Id. at 14.
120 Id.
121 See Order, NCAA v. O’Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Dec 16,
2015), ECF No. 116.
122 See Solomon, supra note 22.
123 See O’Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068, 2015 WL 5712106, at
*26-30 (9th Cir. Sept. 30, 2015) (Thomas, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part).
117

118
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Since the Supreme Court has not heard a case on the
issue of amateurism since Board of Regents some 30 years ago,
the Supreme Court may not be an unrealistic next stop for
O’Bannon v. NCAA given the recent flood of litigation. And
while the Supreme Court only grants certiorari to less than one
percent of the petitions it receives,124 it may consider O’Bannon
to be of high enough social importance to warrant review, given
the growing concerns about compensation of student-athletes
and public scrutiny of NCAA practices.
The injunction affirmed by the Ninth Circuit prohibits the
NCAA from preventing its member schools from offering Division
I football and men’s basketball recruits scholarships for the full
cost of attendance. Since the NCAA amended its regulations at
the January convention, member schools started distributing the
cost-of-attendance stipend to student-athletes.125 A federally
calculated number, the full cost of attendance takes into account
the location of the school and the cost of living.126 In addition to
the grant-in-aid scholarships, it is meant to help students on
financial aid cover expenses outside of tuition, such as “school
supplies, two trips home per year, [and] food.”127 Since it is the
first year the stipend is available for student-athletes, schools
now bear the burden of determining how to implement and
distribute it. Because the full cost-of attendance varies between
schools, coaches and athletic departments have argued that
schools with larger stipends will have a competitive edge when it
comes to recruiting.128
With recruitment letters going out to high school juniors
for the 2017 recruit class as early as fall of 2015, athletic
departments quickly faced the challenge of determining how to
distribute this stipend.129 Athletic departments, which often
project their financial planning for the next three to five years,
had to make immediate decisions involving new forms of student124 Supreme Court Procedures, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federalcourts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1
[http://perma.cc/6YHJ-P8ZE] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
125 Audrey Snyder, Cost of Attendance Stipends Give Scholarship Student-Athletes
a Little Financial Freedom, PITT. POST GAZETTE (Sept. 1, 2015), http://www.postgazette.com/sports/college/2015/09/01/Cost-of-attendance-stipends-give-scholarship-studentathletes-a-little-financial-freedom/stories/201508310052 [http://perma.cc/BRR2-HLVX].
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Jon Solomon, NCAA: ‘Critical’ for O’Bannon Appeal to be Decided by August
2015, CBSSPORTS.COM (Sept. 19, 2014, 5:43 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/
writer/jon-solomon/24716564/ncaa-critical-for-obannon-appeal-to-be-decided-by-august-2015
[http://perma.cc/FE46-59Y9].
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athlete compensation.130 The University of Pittsburgh set aside
$1.1 million to cover the $3,296 annual cost of attendance stipend
for its student-athletes.131 At West Virginia University, the
stipend is one of the lowest in the Big 12 Conference, at $2,700
per student-athlete.132 This will cost the athletic department an
additional $600,000 annually.133 Conversely, Pennsylvania State
University has one of the highest stipends in the NCAA, at
$4,700, costing the school $1.75 million this year.134 This is a
number that the football department now displays proudly to its
recruits, perhaps using it to its competitive advantage.135 This
increase in compensation not only affected the football team; the
Division I school made it a priority to distribute the stipend to all
31 of its athletic programs.136 According to Sandy Barbour,
Pennsylvania State’s athletic director, the stipend is a priority so
students have “access to resources and educational
opportunities.”137 Ultimately, the court’s reasoning holds true
when applied by this athletic director. Here, as the court
suggested it would, the stipend functions as a less restrictive
alternative that preserves both the values of amateurism and the
integration of academics with athletics.
Prior to the Ninth Circuit decision, many universities
began the process of implementing a budget for the $5,000 trust.
The University of Texas developed a plan to allocate $6 million of
its annual budget to pay football and men’s basketball players
through a trust.138 Ultimately these funds can be reallocated for
stipends, but in light of a potential Supreme Court decision in
O’Bannon, member schools should consider the possibility of
eventually compensating student-athletes via a trust. While the
district court’s ruling did not require schools to compensate
student-athletes,139 in order to remain competitive in the
recruitment market, the top athletic schools would understandably
want to create trusts to compensate athletes for the use of their

Id.
Snyder, supra note 125.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Wescott Eberts, Texas Planning to Begin Paying Players $10,000 to
Comply with NCAA Ruling, SB NATION (Oct. 22, 2014, 3:56 PM),
http://www.burntorangenation.com/2014/10/22/7041617/texas-longhorn-steve-pattersonpaying-players-obannon-ruling [http://perma.cc/NE3X-XPJM].
139 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975, 1008-09 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
130
131
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names, images, and likenesses in the event that compensation
through a trust is reinstated as a legal option for Division I schools.
Because student-athletes do not currently receive any
portion of the revenue that schools derive from the use of studentathletes’ names, images, and likenesses, it would seem logical
that most collegiate sports programs are extremely profitable. But
according to the NCAA, in 2010, only 22 of 228 Division I athletic
departments reported seeing profits.140 Research presented by the
O’Bannon plaintiffs, however, suggests that the NCAA and its
member institutions have misconstrued these numbers and that
ultimately, 90% of athletic departments return a profit.141 Either
way, this further establishes that perhaps O’Bannon is not a onesize-fits-all remedy for NCAA reform. Arguably, every Division I
school operates differently due to variations in size, athletic
success, and most significantly, budget restrictions. Additionally, if
a school does not sell the names, images, and likenesses of its
student-athletes, the school will not be able to offer any
compensation through a trust. This supports the NCAA’s argument
that it maintains a competitive balance between its member
schools by promoting amateurism.142 Some argue, however, that
Division I football and men’s basketball already lack a competitive
balance, which has not resulted in a lack of consumer interest or
spending in the industry.143 Ultimately, schools must be “prepared
either way for whatever hand gets dealt.”144
140 Libby Sander, 22 Elite College Sports Programs Turned a Profit in 2010, but
Gaps Remain, NCAA Reports Says, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 15, 2011),
http://chronicle.com/article/22-Elite-College-Sports/127921/ [http://perma.cc/Z9UM-A6XH];
see also Steve Berkowitz & Jodi Upton, Athletic Departments See Surge Financially in
Down Economy, USA TODAY (June 16, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
sports/college/2011-06-15-athletic-departments-increase-money_n.htm
[http://perma.cc/
K6VQ-BCKG]. The NCAA considers an athletic department to be financially self-sufficient
when the school generates revenue from media contracts, ticket sales, and donations that
together exceed the department’s total expenses. In 2010, there were 22 self-sufficient
schools, an increase from the 14 in 2009. Oregon, Alabama, Penn State, and Michigan
earned the top five profits. Berkowitz & Upton, supra.
141 See Declaration of Daniel A. Rascher in Support of Motion By Antitrust
Plaintiffs for Class Certification at 73, In re NCAA Student Athlete Name & Likeness
Licensing Litig., No. 4:09-cv-1967-CW (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2013), ECF No. 748-4
[hereinafter Rascher Declaration]; see also Strom, supra note 30, at 446. In 2011, Dr.
Rasher examined data from 66 member schools and found that more than 90% of the
schools turned a profit. Another study suggested that 70% of universities in major
conferences made a profit. Yet because many universities account for merchandise
sales and other sports-related revenues in nonathletic departments, these significant
revenues are not reflected in the NCAA’s accounting. Id.
142 Marc Edelman, The Future of Amateurism After Antitrust Scrutiny: Why a Win
for the Plaintiffs in the NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation Will
Not Lead to the Demise of College Sports, 92 OR. L. REV. 1019, 1040 (2014).
143 Id. at 1042 (“For example, between 1950 and 2005, just five college football
teams have accounted for a quarter of all top eight finishers . . . [and] just four men’s
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ONGOING LITIGATION AGAINST THE NCAA

In light of the injunction in O’Bannon, many other current
and former Division I student-athletes are seizing the opportunity
to challenge the NCAA’s regulations restricting the compensation
of student-athletes. Not only have cases that were filed prior to
O’Bannon been allowed to proceed despite the injunction, but new
lawsuits against the NCAA also continue to be filed.145 These
claims are indicative of the significant social importance attached
to the compensation of student-athletes, which in turn may
eventually result in review by the Supreme Court.
A.

The Grant-in-Aid Cap

In March 2014, Shawne Alston, a former West Virginia
University running back, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf
of current and former football players in five of the top athletic
conferences in the NCAA: the Big 12, Big Ten, Pac-12, ACC,
and SEC.146 Martin Jenkins, a former defensive back for
Clemson University, and two current Wisconsin athletes filed a
class action stating that financial aid awards and potential
compensation should be determined by an open market and not
regulated by the NCAA.147 These cases were consolidated in In
re National College Athletic Association Grant-in-Aid Cap
Antitrust Litigation,148 to be tried before Judge Claudia Wilken,
who presided over O’Bannon v. NCAA.149
Plaintiffs are seeking an injunction that would prohibit
the NCAA and five of the top athletic conferences from adopting
any limitations on the amount of compensation that may be paid
to student-athletes while in school.150 This class action complaint
argues that the NCAA cannot limit financial aid to tuition, room
Division I college basketball teams represented nearly a quarter of all Final Four
appearances . . . .”).
144 Solomon, supra note 125.
145 See Alston v. NCAA et al., No. 14-cv-01011 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014);
Jenkins et al. v. NCAA, No. 33-cv-0001, (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014); In re Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 2541, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115122 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2014).
146 See Complaint, Alston v. NCAA et al., No. 14-cv-01011 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
2014), ECF No. 1.
147 See Complaint, Jenkins et al. v. NCAA, No. 33-cv-0001, (D.N.J. Mar. 17,
2014), ECF No. 7689.
148 Consolidated Complaint at 1-2, In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grantin-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., No. 2541, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115122 (N.D. Cal. July 11,
2014), ECF No. 61.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 4.
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and board, and books, while excluding incidentals.151 The
plaintiffs argue that former athletes should be awarded damages
for incidentals like travel and other costs associated with being
student-athletes.152 The complaint further alleges that there is a
disparity between the allowable grant-in-aid cap and the actual
cost of attendance, resulting in student-athletes receiving a few
thousand dollars less each year than they would in a competitive
market.153 The complaint states that denying players the benefits
of economic assistance has imposed significant hardships on these
athletes as their lives are much different from the average
student.154 Student-athletes (1) “have much less time and ability to
earn money through part-time jobs than do other students”; (2)
“are more likely to come from low-income households”; and (3) “are
more likely to incur substantial travel costs to attend school.”155
While the O’Bannon decision was tailored specifically to
the compensation for players’ licensing rights, it paved the way
for suits like Grant-in-Aid to continue attacking the NCAA’s
restrictions on student compensation and promoting the need
for more significant reform. Judge Wilken did not grant the
NCAA’s motion to dismiss and noted the differences between
Grant-in-Aid and O’Bannon.156 Most significantly, this class of
plaintiffs contains female student-athletes, which have yet to
be included in prior class-action suits.157
B.

Broadcast Rights

Litigation surrounding the NCAA’s compensation
restrictions has expanded to include a variety of defendants.
Eleven current and former Football Bowl Subdivision and
Division I men’s basketball players are challenging the licensing
and use of student-athletes’ names, images, and likenesses in
advertisements and broadcasts, as well as restrictions on studentathletes’ compensation for such use.158 The plaintiffs seek to
recover damages from three classes of defendants—the major
Id.
Id. at 6.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Jon Solomon, Judge Allows Scholarship Cases to Continue vs. NCAA,
Conferences, CBSSPORTS.COM (Oct. 9, 2014, 6:36 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/
collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24746025/judge-allows-ncaa-scholarship-cases-to-continue
[http://perma.cc/2MFL-NDTS].
157 Id.
158 Complaint at 1-5, Marshall et al. v. ESPN Inc. et al., 14-cv-01945 (M.D.
Tenn. Oct. 3, 2014), ECF No. 1 [hereinafter Marshall Complaint].
151
152
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television networks, licensing companies, and college athletic
conferences—that were allegedly unjustly enriched by using the
names, images, and likenesses of student-athletes in
advertisements and broadcasts without their consent.159
Along with other alleged violations of privacy rights, the
Lanham Act, and tort law, the plaintiffs in Marshall v. ESPN
made an antitrust claim parallel to that in O’Bannon. While
O’Bannon claimed that the NCAA created an unreasonable
restraint on trade, Marshall brought an antitrust claim against
three different groups of broadcast defendants, alleging that
broadcasts of collegiate games violated the use of players’
names, images, and likenesses.160 Since Marshall asserts a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act,161 the court will apply
a rule of reason analysis. As in O’Bannon, the burden of proof
now rests with the defendants to provide a justification for
their departure from a free market system.
C.

Student-Athletes as Employees and the Right to Unionize

The College Athletes Players Association and Kain
Colter, a former Northwestern University quarterback, brought
a suit regarding the restrictions on the unionization of studentathletes at Northwestern University. Plaintiffs argued that
football players on a scholarship should be granted the right to
seek bargaining status and hold elections in favor of
unionization.162 In March 2014, the Chicago National Labor
Relations Board agreed that the players had the right to
unionize. However, when the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) granted Northwestern’s request for review, it
subsequently declined to assert jurisdiction.163 By statute, the
NLRB does not have jurisdiction over state-run schools, which
account for 108 of the 125 Football Bowl Subdivision teams.164
Since the NCAA and the conferences have substantial control
over the majority of the teams, the NLRB held that asserting
Id.
See supra Section I.B; Marshall Complaint, supra note 158, at 1-5.
161 Marshall Complaint, supra note 158, at 1-5, 34.
162 Northwestern University’s Brief to the Regional Director at 1-2, No. 13-RC121359 (N.L.R.B. July 3, 2014).
163 Press Release, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. Office of Public Affairs, Board
Unanimously Decides to Decline Jurisdiction in Northwestern Case (Aug. 17, 2015),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-unanimously-decides-decline-jur
isdiction-northwestern-case [http://perma.cc/AQM8-VEBU].
164 Northwestern Univ. and Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 NLRB 167
(2015), 2015 WL 4882656.
159
160
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jurisdiction over a single team “would not promote stability in
labor relations” across the league.165 Ultimately, this narrowly
focused decision does not preclude reconsideration of the
unionization issue in the future.
As they receive additional compensation, student-athletes
develop a growing economic relationship with their university.
The school compensates players in the form of a grant-in-aid and
in turn is able to govern and control the players’ daily activities
with regard to NCAA athletic competitions.166 If universities begin
to establish trusts to compensate players for the use of their
names, images, and likenesses, student-athletes will have an even
stronger argument for a bargaining collective.
IV.

IMPLEMENTING CHANGES TO THE NCAA MODEL

While the NCAA implemented changes to its regulatory
structure at its annual convention,167 as litigation continues, there
is a need for additional reform to whether and how studentathletes are compensated. In light of the Ninth Circuit’s
conclusion that the NCAA regulations violate antitrust law, there
is now an opportunity to develop a new, more effective model of
compensation for student-athletes. While there are multiple
proposed methods for more complete compensation, such as
paying players directly for their performance and/or licensing
rights, a model needs to be adopted that offers student-athletes
the proper protection from exploitation while still maintaining
amateurism in college athletics.
In amending its bylaws, the NCAA only scratched the
surface of the issue of how to balance player compensation with
the values of amateurism in college athletics. By allowing
additional player compensation in the form of full cost-ofattendance stipends, the NCAA may have avoided a complete
regulatory overhaul; however, there are several more functional
alternatives to the current NCAA model. In order to comply with
the antitrust laws and best serve student-athletes, the most
effective solution is ultimately a combination of both a trust
system and a revenue sharing model.168

165
166
167
168

Id.
Northwestern University’s Brief, supra note 162, at 2-3, 74.
Hosick, supra note 21.
See infra Section IV.B.
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International Olympic Committee Trust Model

The most practical model for reform further develops the
trust fund proposed by the plaintiffs in O’Bannon and accepted by
the Northern District of California. Although the Ninth Circuit
held that the creation of a trust capped at $5,000 was an
erroneous remedy, the NCAA has the ability to implement a
similar compensatory structure through its bylaws. Ultimately,
the most functional trust for both the NCAA and its member
schools is one that mirrors that of the International Olympic
Committee (IOC), the governing organization for the Olympics
and all of its member institutions. The IOC developed a trust
system, very similar to that proposed in O’Bannon, which has a
distribution scheme that would be valuable to college athletes.169
Under O’Bannon, student-athletes are unable to access the funds
in their trust until after they graduate or otherwise leave school.170
But under the IOC, revenue from athletes’ endorsements is held in
a trust that is accessible to them both during and after
competition.171 During competition, only necessary expenses, such
as food and incidentals related to competition, may be paid from
the trust; after a competition season, however, athletes may
personally withdraw the remaining funds.172 Permitting students
to access their trusts only for necessary expenses prior to
graduation would allow them to finance expenses that may not be
covered by tuition and the full cost-of-attendance stipend.
Currently, the NCAA prohibits compensating studentathletes with “funds, awards or benefits not permitted by the
governing legislation of the Association for participation in
athletics.”173 Creation of a trust would involve both the NCAA and
its member institutions contributing a percentage of revenue from
merchandise, video games, and television network contracts that
use the names, images, and likeness of players to the trusts set up
for student-athletes.174 This is a practical compensatory structure
that would allow the NCAA, universities, and conferences to
regulate the trust while the student-athletes are in school.
Furthermore, implementing a spend thrift provision that
prohibits student-athletes from accessing the trust without the
169 Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed
O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of
Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1069, 1104-05 (2010).
170 O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 982 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
171 Wong, supra note 169, at 1105.
172 Id.
173 2013-14 NCAA DIVISION 1 MANUAL, supra note 2, at 58.
174 Strom, supra note 30, at 438.
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approval of a trustee—either the NCAA, a conference, or
university—would provide a safeguard against unnecessary use of
the funds prior to graduation.175 As a trustee, the NCAA could
maintain control over this additional compensation and ensure
that it is used in a way that promotes amateurism and integrates
academics with athletics. For example, the NCAA could create
academic incentives by reducing access to trusts for poor
academic standing.176
Ultimately, a trust model, based on that of the IOC, is an
ideal reform for collegiate athletics, as it will allow the NCAA to
maintain enough control to ensure that the values of amateurism
are maintained. Furthermore, the benefits of a trust system could
eventually be applied to a greater population of student-athletes
outside of men’s Division I revenue sports, including for female
athletes and those who play nonrevenue sports.177
B.

Revenue Sharing and Complete Education Models

As an alternative, schools may implement a revenue
sharing system that allows student-athletes to collect a
percentage of the revenue accumulated by their university from
the use of their names, images, and likenesses, in addition to
their athletic scholarship.178 Advocates of this model further
suggest that the NCAA could promote the values of education by
awarding bonuses for outstanding academic performance.179
Furthermore, if the NCAA revised its amateurism
regulations that restrict compensation for student-athletes to
allow them to receive a portion of the proceeds generated through
personal endorsements or by their team, revenue sharing would
allow student-athletes to further their own financial and
professional gain.180 While it is important to allow studentathletes to participate in an open and competitive market when it
comes to licensing the rights to their names, images, and
likenesses, it is imperative that doing so does not detract from the
value of higher education. Arguably, giving student-athletes huge
amounts of compensation from third parties would detract from
the principle of integrating academics and athletics. Therefore,
combining a revenue sharing system with the distribution method
175
176
177
178
179
180

Id.
Id. at 442.
Wong, supra note 169, at 1105.
Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
Id. at 1105.
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of the IOC trust would allow the NCAA to comply with the
Sherman Act while continuing to apply the ideals of amateurism.
Ultimately, the NCAA could allow student-athletes to be
compensated for the use of their names, images, and likenesses
via the revenue sharing model and could ensure that studentathletes would not have access to the trust until after their
collegiate tenure.
Although some commentators argue for a departure from
the commercialization of the college sports industry to a focus
solely on its educational atmosphere, that is highly improbable.181
College athletics have become a true industry. Fans identify with
their school and athletic conferences. They purchase memorabilia
and pay significant amounts of money to attend games.
Consumers have grown to expect and appreciate the jerseys,
DVDs, and video games that use the images and names of the
players. The demand for this merchandise continues to grow, and
removing the commercialized aspect of the industry would prove
completely impractical.182
While implementation of a trust would be the most
beneficial model for compensating student-athletes, there are
two specific issues that would need to be addressed to ensure
its success. First, the trust would have to comply with Title IX
requirements and apply equally to all athletes. Second, the
NCAA would have to ensure that all of its member institutions
have the financial stability to establish a trust.
Title IX, which was enacted in 1972, requires gender
equality in educational programs.183 It does not, however,
expressly address the equality of payment of student-athletes, as
this was not an issue at the time of its enactment.184 To determine
compliance with Title IX, 10 factors are examined to ensure that
male and female student-athletes are afforded equal
opportunities,185 including, among others, “whether the selection of
Id. at 1102.
Id.
183 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a) (2015).
184 History of Title IX, TITLE IX.INFO, http://www.titleix.info/history/historyoverview.aspx [http://perma.cc/XUF5-6ZBG] (last visited Mar. 4, 2016); Josephine
Potuto et al., What’s in a Name? The Collegiate Mark, The Collegiate Model, and the
Treatment of Student-Athletes, 92 OR. L. REV. 879, 938-39 (2014).
185 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(c) (2015). The 10 factors considered are the following:
181
182

1.

Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;

2.

The provision of equipment and supplies;

3.

Scheduling of games and practice time;
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sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the
interests and abilities of members of both sexes” and the
assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors.186
Equal implementation of the proposed trust model would
alleviate concerns that compensating student-athletes would be
discriminatory towards women’s college athletics. While women’s
Division I sports may not receive as much publicity or media
attention as men’s sports, under this proposal, member
institutions would still be required to implement trusts for all
student-athletes. Each student-athlete would be required to
receive the same percentage of merchandise sales related to their
name, image, and likeness.187
Between merchandise, ticket sales, and broadcast deals,
extremely large sums of money are spent on the college sports
industry each year; however, the top five conferences and schools
receive the majority of this money.188 In order for the trust model
to be successful, it would need to be implemented across all
Division I member institutions. Arguably, the biggest roadblock to
a trust system would be the financial burden on member
institutions, particularly public schools. But thanks to extensive
research throughout the duration of the O’Bannon litigation, a
report filed on behalf of the plaintiffs indicated that these
numbers are a drastic misrepresentation due to convenient
accounting by member institutions.189 After adjusting for
accounting inaccuracies, the report indicated that 70% of the
athletic departments make an annual profit.190 Unfortunately,
that still leaves 30% of the NCAA’s member schools that may not
have the ability to implement additional compensation for their
student-athletes.

4.

Travel and per diem allowance;

5.

Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;

6.

Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;

7.

Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;

8.

Provision of medical and training facilities and services;

9.

Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;

10. Publicity.
186
187
188
189
190

Id. § 86.41(c)(1).
Strom, supra note 30, at 448.
Id. at 446-54.
See Rascher Declaration, supra note 141, at 73; Strom, supra note 30, at 446.
Strom, supra note 30, at 447.
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Ultimately, the purpose of a trust is to compensate
student-athletes only from the profits made by their respective
school and athletic conference. Therefore, when a school or
athletic conference chooses to sell merchandise using the names,
images, and likeness of its student-athletes, they would then
accrue profits that could be distributed into the trusts of the
respective student-athletes. From 2012 to 2013, the retail
marketplace for licensed college merchandise was estimated at
$4.62 billion.191 The royalties from these sales were returned to
the member institutions, indicating that the majority of college
athletics departments do in fact make a significant return
profit.192 There is no indication that implementation of a trust to
share these royalties with student-athletes would financially
destroy athletics departments.
CONCLUSION
Although O’Bannon’s ultimate impact on the NCAA is still
unknown, it did not hold the death sentence for amateurism that
many anticipated it would. It is, however, indicative of the need
for a drastic change to the NCAA and its relationship with
athletic conferences, universities, and student-athletes. In the
words of Mike Krzyzewski, coach for Duke University’s men’s
basketball team, on the need for change in the NCAA, “Many
times when you lose, it’s the greatest opportunity to improve. You
have this unique opportunity to make dramatic change that you
probably couldn’t make when things seem to be going right.”193
Even though the court in O’Bannon rejected amateurism
as a justification for prohibiting any compensation for studentathletes, the decision was quite narrow in its application.
Litigation surrounding compensation of student-athletes is
indicative of the need for a change in the governance of the
NCAA, rather than for a complete change of the entire college
sports industry.
While player compensation has been at the forefront of
issues surrounding college athletics, student-athletes deserve more
than just compensation; they deserve the stability and protection
from exploitation that the NCAA’s regulations help to provide. The
O’Bannon litigation and judicial intervention triggered the
Id.
Id.
193 Coach K Backs NCAA Changes, ESPN.COM (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:22 AM),
http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/9762424/duke-coach-mike-krzyzewskisays-ncaa-needs-new-definition-amateurism-report-says [http://perma.cc/MTY8-3G5N].
191
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necessary action from the NCAA to take regulatory reform into its
own hands. The NCAA was compelled to update its practices or
else face paying damages to a large, injured class of former
student-athletes. The NCAA will best serve student-athletes by
continuing to reexamine its own regulatory structure and creating
a revenue sharing system distributed via a trust model similar to
that of the IOC. By implementing this reform and providing the
full cost of attendance in conjunction with deferred compensation
in a trust, the NCAA will promote adequate compensation of
student-athletes while simultaneously maintaining the core values
of amateurism. Perhaps, with some restructuring, it is possible to
have the best of both worlds.
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